2015]
INFRINGING ON INVESTMENT 573 it was in Sybaris in 500 B.C. This is especially true in the realm of pharmaceuticals, where innovations can have exponential beneficial effects on the quality of life for individuals. In addition to the importance these pharmaceuticals have on the quality of life, they are also incredibly expensive to produce. 16 Pharmaceutical companies argue that they spend hundreds of millions of dollars for research and development on each drug that they are able to market to the public. 17 Patents are necessary for those companies to protect all of the money they invested in producing those drugs. Without them, the pharmaceutical companies may become hesitant to continue on the path of innovation. 18 Furthermore, companies need to have a way to enforce the patents that they have been granted. Normally, they have an enforcement mechanism in the form of the courts in the violator's country under the protections of that country's patent act. However, the Canadian courts have invalidated two of Eli Lilly's patents that should have been protected by the Canadian Patent Act. 19 In response to the court's invalidation of its two pharmaceutical patents, Eli Lilly filed its most current Notice of Arbitration against the Government of Canada under NAFTA on September 12, 2013, seeking $500 million in damages for lost profits on the two drugs that were invalidated prior to their expiration date. 20 NAFTA contains an entire chapter on intellectual property that expands protection of patents. 21 Eli Lilly's claim asserting violations of Chapter 17's intellectual property rights are used to support its basis for relief under Chapter 11's investment protection from "unfair treatment." 22 While it has been postured that Chapter 11 protections can be used to 16 Matthew Herper, The Cost Of Creating A New Drug Now $5 Billion, Pushing Big Pharma To Change, FORBES.COM (Aug. 11, 2013) , available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/ 2013/08/11/how-the-staggering-cost-of-inventing-new-drugs-is-shaping-the-future-of-medicine/. 17 22 Notice of Arbitration, supra note 10, ¶13; Eli Lilly concedes in its complaint that a breach of Chapter 17 alone is not enough to support a Chapter 11 claim, but that it is a factor to consider. Id. at footnote 2. [Vol. 25:3 protect intellectual property rights, 23 this marks the first time that a patent claim has been challenged through the use of investment protection. 24 The lawsuit alone creates a number of issues for all NAFTA countries, and the result, regardless of which side wins, will create further problems that will have to be addressed moving forward, either through the amending of domestic laws or the amending of the trade agreement. It can also open a floodgate of litigation that can negatively impact the signatories of NAFTA because of the costs associated with defending against any future companies that may decide to make a similar claim.
B. Issues
This Note will start of by discussing background information on NAFTA. It will focus on the requirements to file a claim under both Chapter 17, the intellectual property provision, and Chapter 11, the foreign investment protection provision. The Note will then look at the history of the NAFTA claim that has been brought by Eli Lilly, including an analysis of the two lawsuits in the Canadian courts that led to the rise of Eli Lilly's claim under NAFTA. It will also compare the difference between the interpretation of Canadian patent laws and their international counterparts, as one of the allegations is that Eli Lilly could not have been expected to anticipate such a strong departure from international norms when it the patents were first accepted. 25 Next, the Note will take an in-depth look at the Notice of Arbitration filed by Eli Lilly where the company claims that it is entitled to damages because Canada allegedly failed to meet its obligations under the foreign 23 Analyzing Chapter 11, the Note will discuss how an investor can prove unfair treatment and whether Eli Lilly has met its burden of proof with the current claim which focuses on the discrimination of the pharmaceutical industry as a whole with regards to the protection of intellectual property rights under the current judicial interpretation of the Canadian Patent Act. It will also discuss the general repercussions of the filing of the suit along with the additional consequences depending on which party wins the claim. Finally, this Note will discuss how and why the claim should be decided in favor of the government of Canada and the policy reasons supporting the government of Canada in this case. It will argue that Canada should not be held liable for the $500 million that Eli Lilly is seeking for the two patents that were invalidated prior to their expiration date because Eli Lilly has not made a sufficient claim against the government of Canada for unfair treatment under NAFTA's Chapter 11. It will discuss any ramifications that this decision may have on both the international community and the innovation and production of drugs in the pharmaceutical industry. Additionally, it will recommend how the NAFTA signatories can attempt to protect themselves from further litigation under Chapter 11.
II. HISTORY/BACKGROUND
A. NAFTA
Background of NAFTA
On January 1, 1994, NAFTA was launched, and the final policies were implemented on January 1, 2008. 26 The general goal of NAFTA was to increase trade among the signatories by decreasing trade and investment barriers. 27 The NAFTA signatories had the hope of lowering prices for the consumer goods in Canada, Mexico, and the United States.
28 Among a number of other, more specific goals, NAFTA was established to "ensure a predictable commercial framework for business planning and investment" and "foster creativity and innovation, and promote trade in goods and services that are the subject of intellectual property rights. NAFTA has a number of other provisions, including the protection of foreign investments under Chapter 11. 32 If it meets all of the requirements for bringing a claim under Chapter 11, an investor -a company in this instance -may bring a NAFTA claim against one of the signing states even if the claim stems from a violation of the provisions designed to protect intellectual property rights. 33 As will be discussed below, the violation of the intellectual property provisions must show unfair treatment in addition to whatever Chapter 17 violation occurred. 34 The concept of NAFTA was in circulation long before NAFTA went into effect. On an international scale, as opposed to the regional scale of NAFTA, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ("GATT") was in effect from 1948 to 1994. 35 It also had a goal of increasing trade by lowering tariffs. 36 In 1995 the World Trade Organization replaced GATT.
37
On a more regional level, President Ronald Reagan spoke of a North American trade agreement while campaigning in 1979, fifteen years before NAFTA came into existence. 38 In 1989, the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, the precursor to the North American Free Trade Agreement, was signed into law as an agreement between the United States and Canada.
39
In Eli Lilly v. the Government of Canada, two chapters of NAFTA come into play. First, Chapter 17 is necessary to mention as the violations of intellectual property protection partially gave rise to the claim because Eli Lilly alleges that the discrimination against the pharmaceutical industry is indicative of a potential Chapter 11 claim. 40 Second, the notice of arbitration was filed under the investment protections under Chapter 11. 41 Eli Lilly alleges that the pharmaceutical industry in general, and the company specifically, was treated unfairly under Chapter 11 because of the discrimination the pharmaceutical industry faces with regards to how the interpretation of the Canadian Patent Act affects the treatment of their 30 See generally id. at ch. 17. 31 Goolsby, supra note 21, at 9. 32 See generally NAFTA II, supra note 20, at ch. 11. 33 Terry, supra note 23. 34 Id. 35 Bodner, supra note 14. 36 
Chapter 17
Chapter 17 of NAFTA sets forth intellectual property protection requirements for the signatories. It requires Canada -along with Mexico and the United States -to grant patents for inventions that "are new, result from an inventive step and are capable of industrial application." 43 This is the usefulness requirement that was at issue in the two cases that led to Eli Lilly's NAFTA claim. The chapter further states that a country "may revoke a patent only when: (a) grounds exist that would have justified a refusal to grant the patent." 44 The provisions for granting and invalidating patents under the North American Free Trade Agreement are greatly expanded beyond what some of the individual countries had previously operated under, allowing for more patents to be granted. 45 The protection of those patents was also supposed to be expanded, but that desired effect may not be extended to all of the industries that have been issued patents in Canada. 46 NAFTA has a number of provisions relating to intellectual property that include Chapter 17, Articles 2003-21, Annex 2004, and Articles 2106-07. 47 NAFTA creates the "highest standards of protection and enforcement so far achieved by U.S. negotiators." 48 Chapter 17 creates the bare minimum of intellectual property protection, but individual countries are allowed to create domestic laws that provide even more protection if they so choose. 49 Any additional protections that a country invokes must be extended to the other two countries under 1703. 50 However, they are not permitted to lower the standards of intellectual property protection. 51 Eli Lilly is claiming that the judicial interpretation of the Canadian Patent Act had, in fact, lowered the standards of intellectual property protection, at least with regard to the drugs patented by the pharmaceutical industry. 52 The "bare minimum" of protection includes protecting all intellectual property rights, a phrase that is defined broadly under 1703. 53 With regard to patents, NAFTA has imposed the "first to invent" law of the United
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States 54 onto Canada and Mexico. 55 Canada and Mexico had previously been under a first-to-file system. 56 This means at the time of this lawsuit, the first person to conceptualize an invention in the United States, Canada, or Mexico can receive the patent if that person shows proof that they were working on it, even if that person was the second to file for the patent in the patent office.
57 "Canada and Mexico recognize that evidence of invention must be subject to U.S. discovery proceedings to the same extent as if the acts occurred in the United States."
58 This has the possibility of giving Canadian and Mexican inventors priority that they may not have had before NAFTA went into effect as inventors in countries previously applying first to file. 59 Under the previous laws of Canada and Mexico, evidence of being the first to start working on an invention had no bearing on who received the patent. 60 In those countries, the first to effectively file for a patent received the patent regardless of whether that person was the first to start working on that particular invention.
61
Violations of Chapter 17's intellectual property provision can occur in a number of ways.
62 Violation of the intellectual property provision includes the discrimination by one of the treaty signatories against a particular industry. 63 One of the bases for Eli Lilly's claim is that the interpretation of the Canadian Patent Act discriminates against the pharmaceutical industry in violation of Chapter 17. . This change puts the United States more in line with how the rest of the world determines who will be granted a patent as most countries operate under a first to file system. The effect of the changes in patent legislation on NAFTA intellectual property provisions is beyond the scope of this note.) Id. 55 NAFTA II, supra note 29, at art. 1709. 56 Goolsby, supra note 21, at 56. 57 Bodner, supra note 14. 58 64 Id. 65 Goolsby, supra note 21, at 11. cases, damages payable to intellectual property holders, to provide effective recourse against infringements of intellectual property rights."
66 Those damages, however, are presumably less than the damages Eli Lilly is seeking through the use of the foreign investment protection provisions of NAFTA.
NAFTA also allows enforcement beyond what is normally permitted by Chapter 17.
67
[G]eneral enforcement provisions in Chapters 11 and 20 apply to the enforcement of intellectual property rights. Chapter 20 provides a procedure for one state party to bring a complaint against another, to be settled by means of a specified dispute resolution process. Chapter 11 allows a private investor to bring a claim directly against a NAFTA state party. 68 However, just because there is a violation under Chapter 17 does not mean there is automatically a claim for damages under Chapter 11. 69 There are additional requirements to prove a Chapter 11 claim.
Chapter 11
NAFTA's Chapter 11, the section of the trade agreement under which Eli Lilly is seeking damages, protects foreign investments from unfair practices. 70 NAFTA tends to define investments rather broadly, including most property and business interests. 71 The Chapter 11 provisions even specifically include intangible property (i.e., patents) rights in the definition of investment. 72 The main thing that will exclude a NAFTA claim is if an investor is trying to bring a claim against its own government for harm done in that territory. 73 NAFTA's Chapter 11 has traditionally been used when a statute or policy of one of the signatories unfairly discriminates against a company or individual of one of the other two signatories in favor of its domestic 66 Terry, supra note 23. 67 Id. 68 [Vol. 25:3 alternative. 74 Claims generally arise from the protectionist nature of those policies and how they harm the foreign party. 75 Under that interpretation, it is a different type of discrimination than Chapter 17, which includes a provision about discrimination against a specific industry when choosing to invalidate patents. 76 While intangible property is protected under Chapter 11, a violation of the intellectual property protections of Chapter 17 does not automatically mean that there is a violation under Chapter 11.
77 "For a rights holder to establish that a state party has infringed Chapter 11, it must establish a breach of one of the provisions of Chapter 11, such as discrimination, unfair or inequitable treatment not in accordance with international law, or expropriation without compensation." 78 When NAFTA claims are brought under Chapter 11, an international tribunal is established with three members chosen by the investor bringing the claim and the NAFTA party being sued. 79 After arguments by the investor and three NAFTA countries (should the other two choose to intervene on behalf of one side 80 ), the tribunal will write a decision called the award. 81 If a NAFTA signatory is found in breach, it will be ordered to pay damages. 82 NAFTA tribunals are not allowed to recommend that a signatory change its laws. 83 Between the time of its creation and 2010, sixty-four Chapter 11 foreign investment claims were filed for arbitration. 84 Of those cases that have concluded, NAFTA parties have won fifteen times and the foreign entities have won nine times. 85 Of those cases in which Canada was a party, the government has won three times while the investors have won in four instances.
86

B. How this claim arose
In the 1990s, Canada granted patents protecting Eli Lilly's 74 See generally Investor-State Arbitrators, supra note 24. 75 Id. 76 Palmedo, supra note 63. 77 Id. 78 Terry, supra note 23. 79 NAFTA Claims, supra note 71. 80 Id. (All three NAFTA signatories are allowed to make an argument on behalf of one side or the other. However, it is not required that they address the tribunal.) 81 Id. 82 Id. 83 Id. 84 Table] . 85 Id. 86 Id.
2015]
INFRINGING ON INVESTMENT 581 pharmaceutical products, Strattera and Zyprexa. 87 The patents should have been valid for the standard twenty-year period. 88 However, "[a Canadian] Federal Court decision in 2010 invalidated Eli Lilly's patent for Strattera (atomoxetine), a drug used to treat attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), six years before it was due to expire."
89 Canadian federal courts also made "decisions in 2009 and 2011 [that] voided the patent for Zyprexa (olanzapine), an anti-psychotic drug used to treat schizophrenia, which was to expire in April 2011." 90 The patent had been originally granted in 1991 and it, too, had been anticipated to have the standard twenty-year patent protection. 91 The reasoning for invalidating the patents was similar in all of the written judgments. 92 In both cases, there was an attempt to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, which was denied.
93
Both of these lawsuits were brought against a Canadian pharmaceutical company specializing in generic drugs. 94 Both of these drugs had been deemed effective and safe by Health Canada and had been used by "hundreds of thousands of patients in Canada and are commercially successful products."
95 Yet, both of their patents were invalidated, allowing the generic company to manufacture similar pharmaceuticals legally without spending as much money on developing the drugs.
96
In November 2012, Eli Lilly announced that it would be making a NAFTA claim against the Canadian government under the unfair treatment investment protection of NAFTA's Chapter 11. 97 The original complaint was for "$100 million in compensation for the Straterra decision." 98 In June 2013, Eli Lilly amended the complaint after the Zyprexa case was decided and "upped the compensation demand to $500 million after the Supreme Court refused to hear its final appeal of the Zyprexa decision in May."
99 Eli Lilly is essentially using a NAFTA tribunal to appeal the decisions of the [Vol. 25:3
Canadian federal courts.
Cases at issue
The Canadian Court System is, in relevant parts, structurally similar to the court system of the United States. It has local courts that make original decisions that can be appealed to an appellate court and, if granted review, to the national Supreme Court. 100 Much like the judiciary of the United States, the Canadian judiciary is separate from the executive and legislative branches.
101 "Judicial independence is a cornerstone of the Canadian judicial system."
102 This means that Canadian judges are free to interpret the laws passed by the legislature however they choose. As such, they have the ability to introduce new doctrines into common law through statutory interpretation. The doctrine at issue in Eli Lilly's lawsuit against Canada is what Eli Lilly refers to as the "Promise Doctrine," which will be discussed below.
a. Zyprexa
In 2009, the first case at issue was brought in front of a federal court. Eli Lilly had sued the Canadian generic pharmaceutical company Novopharm for patent infringement for the drug Zyprexa.
103 Novopharm had begun to produce a generic version of Zyprexa in violation of the patent protections. 104 Novopharm even conceded that "if the [ ] patent is valid, it is infringing it by marketing a generic version of olanzapine."
105 Therefore, Novopharm challenged the validity of the patent and won. 106 After an appeal and a remand, the patent was ultimately invalidated by the Canadian courts in 2011. 107 The federal judge provided three principles to analyze:
1. There must be a substantial advantage to be secured or disadvantage to be avoided by the use of the selected members.
2. The whole of the selected members (subject to "a few exceptions here and there") [must] possess the advantage in question.
3. The selection must be in respect of a quality of a special character peculiar to the selected group. If further research revealed a small number of unselected compounds possessing the same advantage, that would not invalidate the selection patent. However, if research showed that a larger number of unselected compounds possessed the same advantage, the quality of the compound claimed in the selection patent would not be a special character.
108
These principles are used to determine whether the patent meets the usefulness requirement of the Canadian Patent Act. 109 In assessing the claim that the patent was invalid, the judge took the following steps:
[First] is to decide whether one or more of the asserted advantages of olanzapine was known to exist, or was soundly predicted, at the time the [olanzapine] patent was filed in 1991. Second, I must decide whether at least one of them could be considered a substantial advantage over the [similar] compounds and somewhat peculiar to olanzapine. And, if so, the third question is whether the disclosure of that substantial and special advantage in the [olanzapine] patent was adequate. If I decide any one of them in the negative, I must find the [olanzapine] patent to be invalid.
110
After reviewing the evidence brought forth by both Eli Lilly and Novopharm, the judge in that case determined that "some of the assertions in the [olanzapine] were hopeful. They were based on too little evidence to be factual contentions or even sound predictions of olanzapine's alleged advantages."
111 Because the patent did not have the advantage that it had alleged in its patent application, the judge ultimately decided to invalidate the patent. 112 . . . it is sufficient utility to support a patent that the invention gives either a new article, or a better article, or a cheaper article, or affords the public a useful choice. . . . If when used in accordance with the directions contained in the specification the promised results are obtained, the invention is useful in the sense in which that term is used in patent law. The question to be asked is whether, if you do what the specification tells you to do, you can make or do the thing which the specification says that you can make or do.
119
Under this interpretation of utility, a mere hypothesis that the patent will do what is promised is not enough. 120 The patent must at least partially do what the filer "promised" to do in order to meet the utility requirement.
121
The doctrine of sound prediction has three components. Firstly, as here, there must be a factual basis for the prediction. . . . Secondly, the inventor must have at the date of the patent application an articulable and "sound" line of reasoning from which the desired result can be inferred from the factual basis. . . . Thirdly, there must be proper disclosure. Normally, it is sufficient if the specification provides a full, clear and exact description of the nature of the invention and the manner in which it can 114 Strattera 2010, supra note 19, ¶2. 115 Strattera 2010, supra note 19, ¶3. Prior to this proceeding, Novopharm filed a new drug with Health Canada (the Canadian department in charge of, among other things, determining if pharmaceuticals are allowed to be marketed in the country), making it an interested party. Interested parties are allowed to bring claims in Canadian courts. 116 Id. 117 Id. 118 Id. ¶91. 119 Id. 120 Id. ¶92. 121 Id.
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INFRINGING ON INVESTMENT 585 be practised . . . It is generally not necessary for an inventor to provide a theory of why the invention works. Practical readers merely want to know that it does work and how to work it. In this sort of case, however, the sound prediction is to some extent the quid pro quo the applicant offers in exchange for the patent monopoly. Precise disclosure requirements in this regard do not arise for decision in this case because both the underlying facts (the test data) and the line of reasoning (the chain terminator effect) were in fact disclosed, and disclosure in this respect did not become an issue between the parties. I therefore say no more about it. It bears repetition that the soundness (or otherwise) of the prediction is a question of fact. Evidence must be led about what was known or not known at the priority date, as was done here. Each case will turn on the particularities of the discipline to which it relates. In this case, the findings of fact necessary for the application of "sound prediction" were made and the appellants have not, in my view, demonstrated any overriding or palpable error.
122
That court looked at the evidence presented by Eli Lilly and determined that, although it had enough utility to get approval for distribution, Eli Lilly did not produce enough evidence to show that Strattera did what the patent promised it would do: 123 An invention is only useful if it does what the inventor claims it will do. In this case the requirement of utility would be met if, at the Canadian filing date of the '735 Patent, there was sufficient evidence that atomoxetine was clinically useful in treating some patients with ADHD or, alternatively, that such efficacy could be soundly predicted. That was, after all, what the '735 Patent offeredan effective treatment for ADHD -and that was the consideration required of Lilly for the monopoly it claimed. Proof of utility in this context does not, however, equate with the evidence required to obtain regulatory approval.
124
The court thus invalidated the patent because it did not meet the utility 122 Id. 123 Id. ¶93. 124 Id. 127 It is this "Promise Doctrine" for utility that led to the invalidation of the patents for both Zyprexa and Strattera, along with other patents in the pharmaceutical industry.
128 Under this interpretation, patents are treated to a higher standard than what they were in the past.
129
The judiciary created three main steps that a patent must pass through in order to be valid. 130 First, a judge subjectively construes the "promise of the patent." 131 Second, a heightened evidentiary standard for proof of utility is applied, which requires that the "promised" utility either be "demonstrated" by the patentee or be based on a "sound prediction" of utility as of the date of filing.
132 Third, with regard to "sound prediction," a heightened disclosure requirement mandates that evidence establishing utility must have been disclosed in the original patent application. 
Canadian interpretation vs. other interpretations
The United States has a much more liberal interpretation of usefulness. According to the United States Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, "[a] small degree of utility is sufficient" for protection.
134
Courts have interpreted usefulness to allow for further research so as to incentivize research and development. 135 In its cases against Novopharm, Eli Lilly argued for a similar standard for determining utility under the Canadian Patent Act. 136 The company suggested that it only needed to show a "mere scintilla of utility." 137 The judge conceded that if he or she used the American standard argued by Eli Lilly, that patent would have been valid. 138 "If that phrase means only that atomoxetine be shown to be somewhat useful to treat ADHD, I accept Lilly's point."
139 However, the Canadian courts opted to require a higher standard for usefulness in order for the patents to be valid.
140
Usefulness in patent law, and particularly in the context of pharmaceutical inventions, necessarily includes the expectation of further research and development.
141 "The stage at which an invention in this field becomes useful is well before it is ready to be administered to humans." 142 "Were we to require Phase II testing in order to prove utility, the associated costs would prevent many companies from obtaining patent protection on promising new inventions, thereby eliminating an incentive to pursue, through research and development, potential cures in many crucial areas such as the treatment of cancer."
143
The United States courts that looked at the Strattera patent affirmed it, saying that the mere fact that there was a clinical trial was enough to prove the usefulness of the patents. 144 According to the NAFTA complaint, Zyprexa has been challenged and upheld throughout the world, including in the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Czech Republic, Russia, Portugal, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, China, Finland, Norway, Spain, Bulgaria, and Korea. 145 Eli Lilly asserts that, with regard to both drugs, Canada is the only country to have overturned these patents. 146 This weighs into their allegation that Canada's patent law goes against international norms and is in violation of NAFTA's intellectual property provisions in Chapter 17.
147
In addition to the allegation that Canada's interpretation is different than most interpretations, Eli Lilly's claim goes further to state that the current interpretation is an unpredictable departure from what it was when NAFTA was signed and when the patents were applied for. 148 This is the premise of part of their claim for expropriating investments and treating them unfairly. 149 In fact, Eli Lilly continues to say that, due to the unique nature of pharmaceuticals and the uncertainty associated with drugs when patents are first applied for, the pharmaceutical industry is discriminated 
A. Eli Lilly v. Canada
Eli Lilly has claimed that by implementing a different utility rule than the standard at the time NAFTA was signed and contrary to international norms, "Canada has expropriated Claimant's investments, including in particular its patent rights in both Strattera and Zyprexa, and has failed to provide Lilly with fair and equitable treatment as required under NAFTA Article 1105."
151
There are some in the field that believe that this dispute will turn on the question of whether or not Eli Lilly can prove discrimination from other companies based on location of the company. 152 However, Eli Lilly's claim is not that it was put into a disadvantageous state when compared to other companies, but rather that the "Promise Doctrine" Canada's judiciary used when interpreting patent law is discriminating against the pharmaceutical industry as a whole when compared to other industries receiving patents.
153
That claim is a valid one. All of the eighteen patents that have been invalidated under the "Promise Doctrine" interpretation of Canada's Patent Act have been pharmaceuticals. 154 Chapter 17 of NAFTA states that, "patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to field of technology," 155 and Canada may only revoke a patent on grounds that would have justified a refusal to grant the patent in the first instance. 156 The law supports the contention that the way of interpreting patents in Canada falls below the standard required by NAFTA as evidenced by the fact that the only patents to be invalidated have been from the pharmaceutical industry.
157 Thus, the interpretation of the Canadian Patent Act has discriminated against the pharmaceutical industry. Their complaints regarding Chapter 17's intellectual property therefore is enough to be legitimate one.
However, in order to reach the damages prayed for in the notice of arbitration, Eli Lilly's success turns not on the ability of the company to prove a breach in the intellectual property section, but rather the company's 
Unfair Treatment
NAFTA standards set the definition for unfair treatment based on "the customary international law minimum standard of treatment for aliens" as the minimum standard to be allowed for the investments of investors of another NAFTA signatory. 160 "[I]t states that the concept of fair and equitable treatment does not require treatment beyond that required by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment." 161 "In Neer v Mexico 4 R Int'l Arb Awards (Oct 15 1926) , it was held in order to meet that standard, a plaintiff is required to show that a country's conduct is 'so far short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency. '" 162 This "minimum standard" is a relatively high standard to meet because an investor must prove that a NAFTA signatory's laws and policies deviate so grossly from the international norm that every reasonable and impartial man can tell that the law or policy is inherently unfair. Since the NAFTA provisions went into effect twenty years ago, only nine investors have been able to prove such a strong deviation from the international norm and recover damages under Chapter 11. 
Expropriation of Investments
Eli Lilly has also claimed that the judicial rulings interpreting Canada's Patent Act equate to an expropriation of investments. 164 While nationalization of a sector or seizure of an asset is indicative of expropriation, the idea extends beyond that to include "actions tantamount to expropriation." 165 While the claim invalidating the patents may affect property rights, Eli Lilly still maintains an ownership right over the specific drug. The interpretation of Canada's Patent Act is not "tantamount to expropriation." 167 Therefore, that argument should fail.
Discrimination
Finally, Eli Lilly claims that the invalidation of its patent was discrimination. When interpreting discrimination, the standard is that the "host state treat investors no less favourably [sic] than it treats its own nationals or the nationals of any third state (also known as 'most-favourednation' or 'MFN' treatment)."
168 As previously stated, Eli Lilly points to absolutely no cases in which similarly situated Canadian pharmaceutical companies were treated more favorably than it was. 169 It also fails to note any instances where a foreign company making generic pharmaceuticals were treated less favorably than Novapharm was in the two cases that invalidated Eli Lilly's patents. 
Whether Eli Lilly properly stated a claim under Ch. 11
This case will most likely turn on whether Eli Lilly has sufficiently proven that they were treated unfairly when compared to the treatment of a similarly situated domestic company. 171 As the claim currently stands, Canada meets the minimum standard of fair and equitable treatment because Eli Lilly has failed to prove that a reasonable and impartial man could tell that the "Promise Doctrine" is inherently unfair to the company as an investor. In its current complaint, Eli Lilly has failed to even show that it was treated less fairly than a domestic investor. 172 If it cannot even show that it was treated less fairly than a domestic investor, Eli Lilly cannot show that Canada's policy fails to meet NAFTA's minimum standard of "the customary international law minimum standard of treatment for aliens." 173 Eli Lilly fails to note a single case where a foreign company was VIjuK8ywyAT2wIDIBw&usg=AFQjCNFSkbg1_6nFnJF_Rx7K6L0i8ZDVDA&bvm=bv.77412 846,d.aWw. 166 Id. 167 Id. 168 Id. at 29. 169 Notice of Arbitration, supra note 10, at 24-25. 170 Id. 171 Lester, supra note 152. 172 See generally Notice of Arbitration, supra note 10 (Complaint fails to allege a specific instance where a foreign pharmaceutical company was treated less favorably than a domestic one). 173 Kirk, supra note 160. treated less favorably than a domestic one under the "Promise Doctrine." 174 Canadian courts are using the same standard when looking at all patents, regardless of the country of origin of the patent holder. If there is any basis for a discrimination claim, it comes in the form of discrimination against the industry, not discrimination with regards to country of origin. It fails to fall "so far short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its sufficiency." 175 Eli Lilly is unable to prove discrimination, unfair or inequitable treatment not in accordance with international law. Its strongest case is expropriation without compensation, but it will most likely fail there as well. While Eli Lilly's patent may have been invalidated, it still maintains an ownership interest in the drug through its ability to sell the pharmaceutical in Canada.
Because Canada meets reasonable international standards for its treatment of foreign investors, the Canadian government should not be liable under the foreign investment chapter of NAFTA. Furthermore, in addition to the insufficiency of Eli Lilly's claim, public policy supports finding in favor of Canada and against Eli Lilly.
Arbitration
Arbitration is a binding form of dispute resolution.
176 Arbitration tribunals are expected to make decisions based on applicable law as opposed to what one may consider "fair." 177 The tribunal chosen in this case should decide that Canada has met its obligations under Chapter 11. However, in the interest of equity, Eli Lilly may receive the damages it is entitled to due to the violations of the intellectual property provisions. The relief may not be the entirety of what was prayed for in the notice of arbitration because of the lack of Chapter 11 remedies, but it will still receive some relief.
B. Effect of decision if decided against Canada
In the event that Eli Lilly is successful and the case is decided against NAFTA, there are a number of consequences that would challenge both Canada and the other NAFTA member states. It would force a sovereign nation to change its patent laws and possibly lead to more litigation, both against Canada and the other NAFTA member states. While the prayer for relief in the current litigation is $500 million, the possibility of future [Vol. 25:3 litigation can cost Canada, Mexico, and the United States even more.
178
Whenever a government is a party to the suit, the cost of litigation is inevitably passed onto its citizens through taxes. This means that the citizens of Canada will have the ultimate burden of paying to defend the litigation in addition to paying for any damages that Eli Lilly would be entitled to if it won.
Effectively forces a change in the laws of a sovereign nation
Because the current issue stems from the judiciary's interpretation of utility that has become a part of its common law, the legislature would have to amend the language in its patent legislation to define utility in a way that is more cohesive with the international community's outlook on what utility means. Without any changes to Canada's current Patent Act, Canada's judiciary would be free to continue interpreting utility under the so-called "Promise Doctrine." Any future patents that could be invalided without a change in the legislation could create a large burden on Canadian taxpayers if other pharmaceutical companies seek similar damages for unfair treatment. The best way to insulate itself from future litigation under NAFTA's Chapter 11 would be to change its current laws, regardless of how the tribunal decides this particular case.
When most treaties are signed, it is with the anticipation that the other signatories will continue to legislate in a way that conforms to the provisions of the treaty. However, NAFTA tribunals are expressly forbidden from recommending that the signatories change their laws. 179 Yet, if Eli Lilly were to succeed in its claim, it would effectively require Canada to amend its current Patent Act. As their Patent Act is currently interpreted, it is possible that future patents, particularly pharmaceutical patents, may be invalidated in the future in a manner similar to how the patents in this dispute were invalidated. Should Eli Lilly win and Canada not make any changes to its current law, there is a possibility that other companies will follow in Eli Lilly's footsteps and file substantially similar claims under NAFTA even after it went through the traditional judicial process in the Canadian courts.
Burden on taxpayers for the individual lawsuit
Eli Lilly is seeking "not less than CND $500 million" in damages for the early invalidation of their two drugs. 180 It is also seeking "full If Eli Lilly were to be successful in its NAFTA claim against the government of Canada, it has the possibility of opening up a floodgate of litigation for all three signatories of NAFTA, particularly in Canada where eighteen pharmaceutical patents have been invalidated under the Canadian courts' "Promise Doctrine."
187 Depending on exactly how the case is decided, the filing of the claim alone could lead to an increase in litigation. If it is decided against Eli Lilly based solely on the insufficiency of the claim, it could cause other companies that have had patents invalidated attempt to use this form of litigation to achieve compensation using similar tactics with a materially different facts-for example, suggesting that some law or policy discriminated against the country of origin of the patent holder as opposed to the industry-in order to claim damages under Chapter 11.
Some companies may simply threaten to make a claim against Canada for Chapter 11 NAFTA violations in hopes of getting better protection of their patents. 188 Those companies that threaten Canada with a NAFTA claim may also be doing so in hopes of expediting any damages that they think they are entitled to with the thought that Canada may not want to have to defend against this type of litigation again.
189
If Eli Lilly were to win the case, however, it would incentivize even more companies to go after Canada with similar claims. Any patent holder that had a patent invalidated would have the ability to claim that it had been treated unfairly under the Canadian laws. The potential liability for the government of Canada-and thus the Canadian taxpayers-would be almost limitless. Should each of the remaining invalidated patents lead to similar lawsuits, the government would be forced to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars in both defending the allegations in addition to the lost profit damages for invalidating the patent early and attorneys' fees. If all of the companies whose patents were invalidated seek compensation from Canada under NAFTA, it would also take hundreds of hours for government attorneys to prepare a defense for all of the potential lawsuits, taking them away from other needs of their jobs.
Possibly opens up other NAFTA countries (Mexico and United States) to similar claims
Similar to the increasing liability on the government of Canada, the governments of Mexico and the United States will be subject to a possible increase in litigation stemming from the invalidation of patents by foreign companies in the name of unfair treatment in investment. Though the claim
